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ISSUES IN THE COORDINATION OF MONETARY AND FISCALPOLICY
Abstract
This paper examines issues in the current debate over
coordination between fiscal and monetary policies.
Section II uses the traditional targets-instruments
approach to assess the potential gains from greatercoordination.
Since greater coordination is often equated with looser money
and tighter fiscal policy, two econometric models of the economy
are used to estimate the quantitative importance of the policy
mix. Expectational effects that arise from the government budget
constraint are also analyzed.
Section III shows that our attitudes toward the non-
coordination problem may be quite different depending on why
policies were not coordinated to begin with, and argues that
there are plausible circumstances under which it may be better
to have uncoordinated policies.
Section IV turns to the design of a coordination system.
The game-theoretic aspects of having two independent authorities
are stressed, and I offer a general reason to expect that
uncoordinated behavior will result in tight money and loose
fiscal policy even when both parties would prefer easy money
and tight fiscal policy.
Finally, Section V considers the old "rules versus
discretiont' debate from the particular perspective of this paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Now, as often in the past, there are complaints from all
quarters about the lack of coordination between monetary and
fiscal policy. Indeed, the feeling that monetary and fiscal
policies are acting at cross purposes is quite prevalent. This
attitude, I think, reflects dissatisfaction with the current
mix of expansionary fiscal policy and contractionary monetary
policy, which pushes aggregate demand sideways while keeping
interest rates sky high. This, too, has frequently been so
in the past.
Figure 1 offers a rough impression of the recent history
of monetary-fiscal coordination. It plots the change in the
high-employment surplus (as a crude indicator of the thrust
of fiscal policy) on the horizontal axis and the change in
the growth rate of M1 (as a crude indicator of monetary
policy) on the vertical axis for the years 1961-1980. The
scatter of points does not leave the impression of a strong
negative correlation, as might be expected from well-coordinated
policies. But even by these lax standards, the projected
points for the early 1980's (falling moneygrowth rates with
widening high-employment deficits) will--if realized—-be
exceptional.
The clear implication of the current debate is that greater
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-bebetter. There is so much unanimity on this point that even
an observer as distrustful of government as Milton Friedman
(1982) has urged that the Federal Reserve be brought under
the control of the administration.
This paper tries to take a fresh look at the coordination
issue. Among other things, it raises the possibility that
greater coordination might actually make things worse! The
paper takes as its objectives to raise questions, to clarify
issues, and to stimulate discussion rather than to provide
answers. Where answers are suggested, they should not be
interpreted as etched in stone.
Section II, which follows this summary, focusses on the
potential gains from greater coordination between monetary and
fiscal policy. The first part uses the traditional targets-
instruments approach to examine the possibility that coordination
might not be terribly important because the authorities have
more instruments than they need to achieve the goals of stabiliza-
tion policy. A variety of considerations, however, argue against
the empirical relevance of this possibility.
Since greater monetary—fiscal coordination is often
equated with looser money and tighter fiscal policy, the second
part of this section appeals to two econometric models of the
economy to estimate the quantitative importance of the so—called
mix issue. The empirical results suggest that the effects of
changes in the monetary—fiscal mix may not be as large as many
suppose.Page 3
The final part of Section II deals with expectational
effects that arise from the government budget constraint, here
interpreted to state that the current mix of policies has
important implications for the range of policy combinations
that will be available in the future. I show that the government
budget constraint allows more degrees of freedom than some of
the recent literature suggests, and argue that some authors
have overplayed the role of expectational effects which, while
present, may not be dominant.
Section III turns to the reasons for lack of coordination,
and shows that our attitudes toward the non-coordination problem
may be quite different depending on why policies were not
coordinated to begin with. Here I argue that there are
plausible circumstances under which it may be better to have
uncoordinated policies. An analogy will explain why this may
be so.
Consider the problem of designing a car in which student
drivers will be taught to drive. The car will have two steering
wheels and two sets of brakes. One way to achieve "coordination"
is to design the car so that one set of controls——the teacher's
——can always override the other. And it may seem obvious
that this is the correct thing to do in this case. But now
suppose that we do not know in advance who will sit in which
seat. Or what if the teacher, while a superior driver, has
terrible eyesight? Under these conditions i± is no longer
obvious that we want one set of controls to be able to override
the other. Reasoning that a stalemate may be better than aPage
violent collision, we may decide that it is best to design the
car with two sets of competing controls which can partially
offset one another.
Using the two previous sections as background, Section IV
discusses alternative fiscal—monetary arrangements ranging from
perfect coordination to complete lack of coordination. The
focus here is clearly at the "constitutional" level: what kind
of coordination system would we like to devise? The game-
theoretic aspects of having two independent authorities are
stressed, and I offer a general reason to expect that uncoordinated
behavior will result in tight money and loose fiscal policy
even when both parties would prefer easy money and tight fiscal
policy!
Finally, Section V considers the old "rules versus
discretion" debate from the particular perspective of this paper.
Rules are viewed as ways to resolve the coordination problem
and to alter the fiscal-monetary mix..I conclude that the
celebrated k—percent rule for money growth is unlikely to score
highly on these criteria, and suggest two other rules that
might do better.PAGE 5
II. TARGETS INsTRUMENTS., AND THE GAINS FROM COORDINATION
A. TARGETS AND INSTRUMENTS
The traditional targets and instruments approach of
Tinbergen and Theil provides a useful framework -for thinking
about monetary— fiscal coordination because the coordination
problem is basically one of an effective shortage of
instruments.. Were there, for example, as many fiscal
instruments as targets, the administration might not have to
worry about coordinating its actions with those o-F the
central bank.
As we know from Tinbergen and Theil, simply counting up
instruments and targets is not enough; we need to know how
many independent instruments we have, and this depends on
both the model of the economy and the precise list o-f
targets.. For example, a plausible set of targets -for
stabilization policy might be the level of output (y), the
price level (P), and the share o-f GNP invested (I/Y).If the
fiscal instruments are government spending (6) and the
personal income tax rate (t), then, provided that supply—
side effects a-f tax cuts are big enough, we may have just the
number of instruments we need ——butonly i-f monetary policy
is perfectly coordinated with fiscal policy. Lack of
coordination will make a suboptimal outcome inevitable.PAGE 6
But what if we add a third fiscal instrument:
investment incentives such as accelerated depreciation or an
investment tax credit? Then, at least in principle, fiscal
policy can go it alone: it can achieve the desired levels of
the three targets regardless c-f what monetary policy does.
Now, the notion that monetary policy is a redundant
instrument may not sit well within the Federal Reserve
System. Nor should it, for there surely are additional
targets. For example, we may want to shift the mix of
investment spending away from housing and toward business
fixed investment. To this end, we may want to keep interest
rates high to discourage residential construction while
simultaneously providing strong tax incentives for industrial
capital formation.In fact, precisely this policy mix has
been advocated by Feldstein (1980a) and others, and appears
to have been put in place by the Reagan administration. <1> A
second example is the foreign exchange rate which is strongly
influenced by the level of short—term interest rates, and
hence by central bank behavior.
-Thelikelihood that we have surplus instruments at our
disposal is further diminished by a number of other
considerations. One is that there may be many more targets
than the three traditional ones. For example, the use o-f
tax—and—transfer policies may also be influenced by important
distributional and allocative objectives. The same may be
true of government expenditures; and defense spendingPAGE 7
involves a host of other complex criteria.In addition, the
mix between monetary and -fiscal policy may be influenced by
regional or sectoral objectives, or perhaps just by a desire
not to force one region or sector to bear too mLtch of the
burden of stabilization policy. For example, a desire not to
devastate the housing industry may be a reason not to rely
entirely on restrictive monetary policy to limit aggregate
demand. Like fiscal policy; monetary policy also has
important allocative effects.
In fart, the situation is a good deal worse than this
because the instruments themselves may be targets. It may
be, for example, that the government has an explicit
objective for the ratio o-( 6/? which limits the use of S as a
stabilization tool. Or perhaps sizable movements in policy
instruments entail significant costs of their own ——costs
which preclude moving all the way to the global optimum.
Timing considerations make it still less likely that we
have more instruments than we need. Policy instruments like
6 and M may have rather different effects on target variables
in. the short and long runs. For example, both probably have
strong (and rather similar) effects on unemployment in the
short run, but little if any effects in the long run. This
makes it crucial to coordinate monetary and fiscal plans as
they un-fold through time.
Uncertainty may also reduce the effective number of
instruments. For example, we may feel less uncertain aboutPAGE 8
the effects of particular monetary— fiscal combinations than
we do about the effects of individual instruments used in
isolation. If so, then coordination becomes that much more
critical.
The conclusion seems to be that, while it is logically
possible that we have more instruments than we need, the real
world seems to be characterized by a shortage of instruments
in the relevant empirical sense. Consequently, we should
expect failure to coordinate fiscal and monetary policy to
lead to losses of social welfare..
B. THE CAPITAL—FORMATION ISSUE
As I mentioned at the autsetconcernthat our current
policy mix will prove damaging to capital formation seems to
be the potential loss of social welfare that is at the heart
of contemporary worries aboutmonetary—fiscalcoordination.
Because of their effects on investment, each of the tools
of demand management also has long—run implications for
aggregate supply. Put most simply, fiscal expansion probably
pushes up real interest rates, thereby inhibiting capital
formation and slowing the growth of aggregate supply.
Monetary expansion should have the opposite effects on
interest ratesand investment. Therefore, it is argued, a
tighter fiscal policy and a looser monetary policy would
provide a climate more conducive to investment and growth.
But just how large are these effects in practice?PAGE 9
To get a serious quantitative answer, I see no place to
turn buttothe much—maligned large—scale econometric models.
Otto Eckstein and Christopher Probyn (1981) recently reported
the results ofasimulation exercisewith the DRImodel in
which the actual fiscal and monetary policies of the
1966—1980 period were replaced by a mix of policies less
expansionary on the fiscal side and more expansionary on the
monetary side.
The period in question was one in which DRI's version of
the full—employment deficit averaged about $27 billion,
varying between ahcut zero and $64 billion. In the
alternative scenario simulated by Eckstein and Probyn the
fLd1—employmerit budget wasroughIy bal ariced every year, and
monetarypolicy (defined by nonborrowed reserves) was
adjusted to maintain approximatelythe same timepath for the
unemployment rate.Howdifferent would the economy's
evolutionhave been underthis alternative monetary—fiscal
mix?
According to theDRI model, the investment share in GNP
wouldhave been about one—half percentage pointhigher in a
typical year of the simulation, leading to a cumulative
increase in the capital stock over the 15—year period of
about 5.37.. As a consequence, potential (and hence actual)
real GNP in 1980 would have been about 1.67. higher than in
the historical record. The GNP deflator in1980 would have
been2.67. lower, which translates to an average reduction inPAGE 10
theannual inflation rate ofabout 0.2 percentagepoints.
As Robert Solow once remarked, the nice thing about
large—scale econometric models is that they always have an
answer forevery question. Whatwe want to know, of course,
is whether the DRI model's answer to this particularquestion
is roughly correct. This, unfortunately, is unknowable. The
nextbest thing is to get another large—scalemodel to answer
thesame question, and then compare the responses.
Fortunately,Albert Ando kindly volunteered to run more or
less the same policy change on the MPS model. Some
modifications had to be made because of the different
structures of the two models. (Examples: Neither
full—employment GNP nor the full— employment deficit isa
variable in the MPSmodel;the simulation period was
1967—1981 instead of 1966—1980.,) But an effortwas made to
come as close as possible to duplicating the Eckstein—Probyn
policy of tighter budgets and looser money with no effecton
Linempi oyment.
The MPS results were generally lesssanguine about the
potential gains from a switch in the policy mix. For
example, the share of business fixed investment in GNPwas
only about 0.3 percentage point higher in a typicalyear of
the easy—money, tight—fiscal simulation with theMPS model.
Correspondingly, the gains in real output were smaller: real
GNP in the final year of the simulationwas just 1V. higher
(versus 1.67. with the DRI model).PAGE 11
Bigger differences emerged on the price side of the
model. Whereas the DRI simulation said that the GNF deflator
would be 2.67. lower by the end of the 15—year period, the MPS
model put the de-Flator 0.57. higher. The difference here
seems to stem from the divergent behavior of the money supply
in the two models. According to the DRI model, the "easier
money" policy actually leads to a slightly lower money
supply whereas the MPS model shows the money supply
increasing slightly.
Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. But these
effects, while generally favorable, seem quitemodestto me
especially when you realize that the swing in fiscal policy
was extremely substantial. Under the historical
stabilization policy mix, the cumulative increase in the
national debt during this 15—year period was more than $350
billion for DRI and about $450 billion for MPS. Under the
hypothetical policy with a balanced full—employment budget,
the debt would have declined by about $45 billion according
to DRI and by about $19 billion according to MPS.
-Thus,according to these models, an enormous change in
the policy mix would have caused only a modest increase in
real output.Andthe two models cannot even agree on whether
prices would have increased or decreased as a result.
C. THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET CONSTRAINT AND EXPECTATIONS
Dynamic constraints across choices of policy mixesPAGE 12
arise from the so—called government budget constraint, the
accounting identity that insists that every budget deficit
mLlst be financed by selling bonds either to the public or to
the Fed. This identity points out that today's fiscal—
monetary decisions have implications for the number o-f bonds
that will have to be sold to the public today, and thus for
the feasible set of fiscal—monetary combinations in future
periods. <2>
For example, suppose an expansionary -fiscal policy today
leads to a large deficit that is not monetized. Future
government budgets will therefore inherit a larger burden of
interest payments, so the same time paths of 6, t, and M will
lead to larger deficits. What will the government do about
this? That depends on its reaction function. For example,
large deficits and high interest rates might induce greater
monetary expansion in the future (the possibility emphasized
by Sargent and Wallace (1981)).Alternatively, it might
induce future tax increases (the case stressed by Barro
(1974)), or cuts in government spending (the apparent hope of
Reaganomics). Yet another possibility is that the government
will simply finance the burgeoning deficits by issuing more
and more bonds. <3>
All of these are live options, and have different
implications for the long run evolution of the economy.In
fact, under rational expectations, they may have different
implications for the current state of the economy.PAGE: 13
Consider, as an example, the effects on consumer
spending of a tax cut financed by issuing new bonds. Such a
tax cut today enlarges current and prospective future budget
deficits, thereby-requiring some combination of the following
policy adjustments:
(1) increases in future taxes;
(2) decreases in future government expenditLires;
(3) increases in future money creation;
(4) increasesinfuture issues of interest— bearing
national debt.
To the extent thatthecurrent decisions made by individuals
and firmsare influencedby their expectations about the
future, each of these alternatives may have different
implications for the effects of the tax cut today.
For example, if people believe that a tax cut financed
bybonds simply reduces today staxesand raises future taxes
in order to paytheinterest on the bonds, then consumption
may not be affected.. This is essentiallyBarro's (1974)
argument.
Alternatively, people may believe that the policy will
eventually lead togreater money creation. I-fso, the
inflationary expectations thereby engendered may affecttheir
currentdecisions in ways that arenotcaptured by standard
behavioral 4unctions. This isessentiallythepointmade by
Sargent and Wallace (1981)inarguing that tightmoney may be
inflationary.PAGE
Stilldifferent reactions would be expected if people
thought the current deficit would lead to lower government
spending or to more bond issues in the future. The
theoretical possibilities are numerous,limitedonly by the
imagination of the theorist. <4>
Rational expectations interact with the government budget
constraint in an important way. Feopie's beliefs about the
futL(re consequences of current monetary—fiscal decisions are
conditioned by their views of the policy rules that the
authorities will follow. To the extent that these beliefs
affect their current behavior, different policy rules
actually imply dif-ferent short—run policy multipliers under
rational expectations.
A key question for policy formulation is: how impnr1nt
are these expectational effects in practice? This seems to
depend principally on how forward—looking current economic
decisions really are. Take the tax cut example again. Under
the pure permanent income hypothesis (PIH) only the present
discounted value o-flifetimeafter—tax income flows affects
current consumption. <5> So expectations about future budget
policy should have important effects on current consumption.
But if short—sightedness. extremely high discount rates, or
capital market imperfections effectively break many of the
links between the future and the present, then current
consumption may be rather insensitive to these expectations
and rather sensitive to current income. Even under fulJ.yPAGE 15
rational expectations and the pure PIH, consumption may
depend largely on current income if the stochastic process
generating income is highly serially correlated. These are
issuesabout which knowledge is accumulating; butmuch
remainsto be learned. Theevidence todatedoes not lead to
theconclusion' that long—term expectations rule the roost.
<6:::.
Theother two places where expectations about future
fiscaland monetary policies might have significant effects
on current behavior are wage and price setting and
investment.
Investment., of courses isthequintessential example o-f
aneconomic decision which is stronqly conditioned by
expectations about the -Future. Even Keynes knew thisBut
once again, there are somereal—world considerationsthat
interferewith the strictly neoclassical view of investment
astheunconstrained solution to anintertemporal
optimization problem. One is that capital rationing may
interfere with a firm's ability to run current losses on the
expectation offutureprofits. Asecondis that management
may use ad hoc rules such as the payback period criterion in
appraisinginvestment projects. A third is that management
may be more shortsighted than it"should be." Afourth is
that there may be ——and probably is —— a strong accelerator
elementin investment spending, which ties the current
investment decision much more tightly to the current state ofPAGE 16
the economy than neoclassical economics recognizes. As in
the consumption example, each of these things diminishes the
importance of the fLiture to current decision making and
thereby renders expectational effects less important.
Wage and price setting is another important example. Ad
hoc rules which adjust wages or prices in accordance with
"the law of supply and demand," or which are mainly backward
looking, render expectational effects rather unimportant.
But rules which are based on forward looking considerations
(such as expected future excess demand) make expectational
effects crucial. Again, this is an area where we must learn
much more before we can make any definitive judgments. <7>
A word on uncertainty seems appropriate before leaving
this topic. It seems to me that people probably attach great
uncertainty to their beliefs about what future government
policies will be.If so, the means of their subjective
probability distributions may have far less influence on
their current decisions than the contemporary preoccupation
with rational expectations would suggest. For example, how
much influence does the two— week— ahead weather forecast
have on your decision about whether or not to plan a picnic
on a given date?
Similarly, the importance of expectations for
macroeconomic aggregates is diminished by the likelihood that
different people hold different expectations about what
future government policies are likely to be. <8> If somePAGE 17
people believe today's tax cuts signal higher future taxes,
some believe they signal higher future money creation, and
some believe they signal lower future government spending,
then expectations about the future may havemeager current
effects in the aggregate.
The conclusion seems to be that, while we should not
forget about expectational effects operating through the
government budget constraint, neither should we get carried
away by them. There is no reason to believe that they are
the whole show.
III. REASONS FOR LACK OF COORDINATION
Is more coordination necessarily better? At first
blush, this question seems to admit only an affirmative
answer. But further reflection suggests that things are not
quite so clear.
If the central bank and the government agree on what
needs to be done, but a coordinated approach cannot be
promulgated because of perverse behavior by one o-f the two
authorities, then it is clear that coordination mustimprove
things. Indeed, the type of coordination we want is also
clear: the sensible policy maker must dominate theperverse
one. Would that things were so simple'PAGE 18
So let us ask why, in reality, fiscal and monetary
policies are sometimes so poorly coordinated. If we assume
that both authorities are basically sensible, then lack of
coordination can stem from one of three causes (or, of
course, from combinations of the three):
(1) The fiscal and monetary authorities might have
different objectives, i.e. different conceptions of what is
best for society.
(2) The two authorities might have different
opinions about the likely affects of fiscal and/or monetary
policy actions on the economy,, i.e., they might adhere to
different economic theories.
(3) The two authorities might make different
forecasts of the likely state of the economy in the absence
of policy intervention. Divergent forecasts could result
either from different economic theories (as in (2) above)or
from different forecasts of exogenous variables.
In each case, if we were certain about which of the two
authorities was correct, then we would know what to do about
the coordination problem. We would simply put all thepolicy
levers in the hands of the authority with theproper
objective or correct theory or accurate forecast, just as we
would want the instructor, not the student, to have ultimate
control over the learn—to—drive car.PAGE 19
But, in fact, we rarely know this in any particular
case. And we certainly have no basis for setting out a
general constitutional rule predicated on one or the other
authority "always" being right. As a consequence, we may
conclude, as in the student driver example, that the best
strategy is to give some power to each authority, but at the
same time to give each some ability to cancel out the actions
o-F the other.
Let us examine each of the three possible reasons for
lack o-f coordination in turn, using the simple targets—
instruments framework. To keep the discussion as elementary
as possible, I assume (for thissection only) that there are
to targets and two instruments.
A. A FRAMEWORK
InFigure 2 there are twotargets: the gap between
actualand potential real output (y — y*), which serves as a
proxy for both unemployment (via Okun's law) and inflation
(via the short—runPhillips curve), andthe share of
investmentin GNP (I/Y). Similarly, there aretwo
instruments: monetary and fiscal policy. Point A indicates
the position which the economy is forecast to attain if
neither policy instrument is changed.I-f the origin is
interpreted as the global optimum, then real output is too
high and the investment share is too low.
The vectors m and f, emanating from point A, indicatePage 19A
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the effect of a unit expansionary move of the monetary and
fiscal instrument, respectively. Expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies each raise output(therebylowering
unemployment and raising inflation), but monetary expansion
raises investment while fiscal policy expansion lowers it.
The line from A to 0 shows that a fully coordinated fiscal
and monetary plan can in this case achieve the global
optimum. And the dotted lines from A to B and from B to 0
indicate the two pieces of the coordinated policy plan:
fiscal restriction pushing the economy from A to B and
monetary expansion pushing from B to 0.
Having outlined this ideal situation, let us now
consider the various reasons for lackofcoordination.
B. DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES
First assume that the monetary and fiscal authorities
agree both on the relevant economic theory and on forecasts
for all the important exogenous variables. They disagree
only over the objectives of economic policy.
-Figure3 adds one new wrinkle to Figure 2.The target
of the fiscal authority is assumed to be point F, while the
central bank wants to push the economy to point N, which has
a lower level of real activity, instead. If the
administration is given control over both instruments, then
point F will result along the path ABF. But if the central
bank is dominant, then point N will result along the pathPAGE 21
ADM. Monetary policy will be less expansive and fiscal policy
more restrictive.
-
Butwhat will happen if neither authority is in complete
control? That is difficult to say One possibility ——
thoughcertainly not the only one ——isthat the central bank
will put the monetary portion of its optimal plan (line DM)
into effect while the government follows the fiscal portion
of its own optimal plan (line AB). This is certainly an
instance that we would call "lack of coordination." But is
the outcome so bad?
Figure 3 shows that the economy will reach point C,
which is a kind of compromise between point F (the
administration's target) and point M (the Fed's target).If
the truesocial optimum ——whateverthat means! ——remains
point 0, then the "uncoordinated" outcome may conceivably be
superior to either of the two "coordinated" outcomes.
But, you may object, would it not be better still if the
fiscal and monetary authorities Jointly agreed to pursue
point 0? 0+ course. But this objection misses the point.
When there is true disagreement about what best serves the
commonweal, how can we expect a joint decision to be reached
except as a political compromise? And why should we think
this political compromise will be any better than point C?
The solution, of course, is simple to state and
impossible to achieve. We want policy makers to agree on





coordinated manner. But this is a counsel ofperfection
which givesusnogL(idanc.e in any particular instance. If
fiscal and monetary policy makers agree to pursue
inappropriate goals, the policy we get, while well
coordinated, may leave us unhappy.
C. DIFFERENT MODELS OF THE ECONOMY
Similarissues arise if the Fed and the administration
agreeon the objectives and the forecasts, butdisagree about
howfiscal and monetaryinstruments affect theeconomy. To
cite a not— too— hypothetical example, suppose a supply—side
administrationbelieves that it canexpand the economy by tax
cuts withoutharming investment, while a monetarist central
bank believes that deficits crowd ut private investment.
Figure 4 depicts what may happen in such a case. The
fiscal authority believes that movements of the two
instruments in the expansionary direction have the effects
indicated by vectors I (tax cut) and m (money supply
increase). Its optimal plan shoots for point 0 by combining
expansionary monetary policy (line DO) with a tax hike (line
AD). But the monetary authority believes the relevant policy
multipliers are as indicated by vectors t and m, and so feels
that path ABO is the way to reach point 0. Along ABO, fiscal
policy is less contractionary and monetary policy is less
expansionary than along ADO.





possibilities. If the fiscal authority's concept a-F the
optimal plan is promulgated, we will get point 0 if its model
is correct but point F if the Fed's model is correct. On the
other hand, if the Fed's optimal plan is accepted, we will
get point 0 i-f it has the correct model but point M i-f the
administration's model is correct.
An "uncoordinated" system, in which the Fed pursues its
version a-f optimal monetary policy while the administration
pursues its version a-F optimal -fiscal policy, leads to point
C if the Fed has the correct model and point 6 i-f the
government has the correct model. Coordination is obviously
better only i-f a probability blend o-F points 0 and F
(representing domination by the fiscal authority) or a-F
points 0 and M (representing domination by the monetary
authority) is clearly superior to a probability blend a-F
points C and 6.It is by no means inevitable that this must
be true.
D. DIFFERENT FORECASTS
The case- in which the -fiscal and monetary authorities
agree on both the goals for economic policy and the model of
the economy ——aremote possibility, it must be admitted ——
requiresno further analysis. Since it is the discrepancies
between the targets and the state the economy would attain
with no change in policy that really matter, the formal
analysis a-f the case of different targets applies herePAGE 2L
directly. We need only read Figure 3 backwards and view ABF
and ADM as two paths that emanate from different initial
points but lead to the same terminal point.
As before, the principle is obvious, but impossible to
implement: we want to give all the power to the policy maker
with the correct forecast. Good luck' Alternatively, if
neither policy maker has a monopoly on knowledge, we want a
weighted average forecast with appropriate weights. But who
decides on the weights, gets both authorities to use them,
and then makes sure that neither party shades his forecast to
make the weighted average come out more to his liking?
E. CONCLUSION
Where does all this leave us? It seems that whenever
fiscal and monetary policy appear to be uncoordinated e must
ask ourselves: who is right? If there is one clearly
correct policy maker, then the right thing to do is to
achieve coordination by giving it control over all the policy
levers. But if this is not the case, as it often will not
be, we are left with no clear a priori argument that more
coordination is better.
This should not be a foreign notion in a country that
has always prided itself on its constitutional system o-F
checksand balances. Dispersion of power is one safeguard
against misuse of power, in economic policy as elsewhere. We
know that checks and balances can sometimes lead to
stalemate, or to conflicts between different branches ofPAGE 25
government, butinmany cases we view this as a reasonable
price to pay for protection against abuse of power. Is
economic policy so different?
One plausible viewpoint is that the fiscal authorities,
being elected officials, have the right social welfare
fLinction, and so their targets for policy should be accepted.
This seems a tenable attitude in a democracy. But consider
the following possibility. Suppose the body politics in its
1914 wisdom, realized that the president and Congress would
beLinduly swayed byshort—run considerations, and so created
theFed as a counterweight to make sure that the long run did
notget ignored.. Thenwemightnot wantto accept blithely
thesocial welfare function of each newly— elected
administration.
Besides, evon if we accept the validity of the
administration's objectives, we are still in a muddle over
what to do if we simultaneously believe that the Fed has a
better model of the economy and is better (or at least more
honest) at forecasting. Can we then force the Fed to reveal
its model and forecasts to thea!1ministration? Freedom of
information argues that we should try, but past experience
suggests that we may not succeed. But in any case, how can
we be sure that the administration will accept the Fed's
model of the economy?
Ithink we must face up to the obvious, though
uncomfortable, conclusion. When no one can be sure what isPAGE 26
the right thing to do5 no one can ensure us that a unified
fiscal— monetary policy authority will do better than the
two— headed horse we now ride.PAGE 27
IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF COORDINATION
With the previous two sections as background this
section considers a variety of models of fiscal— monetary
coordination (or lack thereof). Two questions occupy our
attention here: What kinds of outcomes are likely to arise
from alternative interrelationships between the fiscal and
monetary authorities? and, Are these outcomes socially
attractive or not? The focus in this section is clearly at
the "constitutional" level, that is, on the kinds of
coordination mechanisms, if any, we would like to put in
place.
A. A SINGLE, UNIFIED POLICY MAKER
At one end o-F the spectrum is the case of. a single,
unified stabilization authority with control over all the
relevant instruments, whether fiscal or monetary. This
system could most plausibly be achieved in the United States
(and in other democracies) by subordinating the central bank
to the administration, as in Friedman's (1982) suggestion.
<9> But whether this would be a better system than what we
have now depends on the considerations outlined in the
previous two sections.
(1) How severe is our shortage of instruments inPAGE 28
the relevant empirical sense? The greater the shortage,
relative to the targets we are pursuing, the greater the
potential gains from better coordination..
(2) How uncertain are we about the proper goals
and methods of stabilization policy, and also about which of
the two authorities has sounder views on these questions?
Thegreater theuncertainty, the more risky it is to put all
oureggsin onebasket.
Onbalance1 it is far from clear that these
considerations lead to support for Friedman's suggestion.If
we take output (or unemployment), the price level (or the
inflation rate), and the fraction of NP invested as the
three principal target variables, then the shor-tage of
instruments may not be a serious one. s pointed out in
Section II, the fiscal authorities cane in principle, use
control over government purchases, personal income tax rates,
and investment incentives such as depreciation allowances and
the investment tax credit to push all three of these target
variables to their desired level.s. regardless o-f what
monetary policy isdoing. It may be that the more serious
coordinationproblem is getting the disparate elements of the
fiscalteam to work together.
On the other hand, it would seem that uncertainty about
which policies are best is pervasive in these days of
macroeconomic agnosticism. Debates over the appropriate
goals for policy and the effects of policy changes on thePAGE 29
economy are perhaps more heated now than at any time since
the early days of the Keynesian revolution. While my own
feeling is that the extent of contemporary agnosticism is not
quite merited by the evidence, this is a minority view. And
I rather doLlbt that we would want a constitutional convention
today to place all authority over macroeconomic policy in the
hands of either the devoutly supply— side administration or
the putatively monetarist Federal Reserve.
It seems unlikely that the model of a single, unified
monetary— fiscal authority is descriptive of actual policy
making arrangements in the United States. The only
econometric study of fiscal—monetary coordination in the U.S.
that I know of, by Coldfeld and myself (1976) some years ago
concluded that "the abstraction of a single authority
conducting stabilization policy in the United States is Just
that——anabstraction with little or no empirical validity"
(p. 792). Using the MPS model to assess the effects of
policy on real GNP, we found a slight positive correlation
between the effects of fiscal and monetary policy over the
whole 1958—1974 period. But this was the net result of a
substantial positive correlation while Republican presidents
were responsible for fiscal policy and a negative correlation
during the Kennedy—Johnson years.
One final observation on the fully—coordinated case is
pertinent in this context. A single, unified policy maker
with an entire portfolio of fiscal and monetary instrumentsPAGE 30
to manage may find it optimal to couple expansionary monetary
policy with contractionary fiscal policy or vice versa, Just
as an investor may find it optimal to buy one share long and
sell another short.
Thus the fact that we sometimes see fiscal and monetary
policy tugging aggregate demand in opposite directions is not
evidence that the two policies are uncoordinated. For
example, Figure 2 offered an example in which a properly
coordinated policy package requires contractionary fiscal
policy and expansionary monetary policy. While the example
is a simple one o-fcertaintyand an equal number o-ftargets
andinstruments, the basic lesson is probably very robust and
holds ——thoughnot so sharply ——inan uncertain world with
a shortage of instruments. It suggests that policy may
sometimes appear uncoordinated when it is not.
This point is neitheracademic nit—picking nor a
theoreticalcuriosum.. For example, the policy mix that many
economists advocate right now combines a more expansionary
monetary policy with a more contractionary fiscal policy in
the coming years. This is offered as an example of well—
coordinated monetary and fiscal policy while the current
policy mix (tight money with loose fiscal policy) is supposed
to illustrate lack of coordination.. Clearly, coordination
does not imply correlation.
B. TWOUNCOORDINATED POLICYMAKERS
Attheopposite end of the coordination spectrum comesPAGE 31
the case of two independent authorities, one in charge of
fiscal policy and the other in charge ofmonetarypolicy,
with neither one dominating the other. This model may
approximate actual policy making arrangements in the
contemporary United States. <10>
When the two policy makers are at loggerheads, a policy
mix of tight money and loose fiscal policy frequently
results, with deleterious effects on interest rates and
investment. <11> What outcome does theory lead us to expect
when fiscal and monetary policy are in different hands and
the two parties cannot (or do not try to) reach agreement?
A natural way to conceptualize this situation is as a
two—person non—zero—sum game. And a natural candidate for
what will emerge, it seems to me, is the Nash equilibrium.
<12> Why the Nash equilibrium? Both policy makers
understand that they do not operate in a vacuum.. Each
presumably understands that he is facing an intelligent
adversary with a decision making problem qualitatively
similar to his own. Furthermore, this is a repeated game;
each policy maker has been here before and assumes that he
will be here again.' It seems natural that each would assume
that the other'will make the optimal response to whatever
strategy he plays.If so, each will probably play his Nash
strategy.
Let us see how the Nash equilibrium works out in a
moderately realistic example. (See the payoff matrix inPAGE '32
Figure 5.)I assume that each policy maker has two available
strategies: contraction or expansion.I also assume that
they order the outcomes differently, but know each other's
preference ordering. Specifically, the fiscal authority
(whose preference ordering appears below the diagonal in each
box) is assumed to favor expansionary policy. From its point
of view, the solution where both play "expansion" is best
(rank 1) and the solution where both play "contraction" is
worst (rank 4). The monetary authority (whose ordering
appears above the diagonal) wants to contract the economy to
fight inflation, and so orders these alternatives in the
opposite way. However, as between the two outcomes which
combine expansion and contraction, I assume that the two
players agree that easy money with a tight budget is a better
policy mix than tight money with a loose budget.
This explains the entries in the payoff matrix (Figure
5). Now where is the Nash equilibrium? If the Fed plays
"expansion," the administration will also play "expansion,"
and the Fed will wind up with its least— preferred outcome
(the lower righthand box). So the Fed will play
"contraction." Knowing this, the administration's best
strategy is "expansion," so the outcome will be the lower
lef€hand box. Clearly, this is the only Nash equilibrium for
this game. It also seems to be the most plausible outcome o-f
uncoordinated but intelligent behavior.
But notice something interesting about this outcome.;it L
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Both the Fed and the fiscal authority aQree that the upper
righthand box ——easymoney plus tight fiscal policy ——is
superior to the Nash equilibrium. Under full monetary—
fiscal coordination, they might well select this policy mix.
But, if they cannot reach an agreement, then the Nash
equilibrium ——aPareto— inferior outcome ——islikely to
arise. Here is a case in which some degree of coordinatian
——atleast enough to avoid the inferior Nash equilibrium ——
isbetter than none even if we cannot decide which authority
has the right social welfare function. <13>
If this exampleistypical, then switching from a system
of two uncoordinated policy makerstoone with a single,
unified policy maker miçht yield substantial gains. And
there is good reason to think that it is typical, because
Nash equilibria in two—person non— zero— sum games are very
often not Pareto optimal.
The problem, of course, is that achieving greater
coordination is more easily said than done. The two
authorities havereasonsfor disagreeing ——reasonswhich may
not be easily ironed out. However, this example illustrates
that full coordination (which is probably impossible in any
case)may not be critical. What we need in this case is no
more than an agreement to consult with one another enough to
avoid outcomes that both parties view as inferior. Maybe
this is not too much to ask.
However,things become far lessclear if onepolicyFAGE 3Lt
maker lacks knowledge of either the preferences or the
economic model of the other. Then there is no particLilar
reason to think the Nash equilibrium will result, and other
solutions become equally plausible. For example, each player
may simply pursue his global optimum, ignoring the decision
c-f the other. <14> There are other possibilities as well.
C. LEADER—FOLLOWER ARRANGEMENTS
An alternative model of fiscal—monetary coordination,
intermediate between the two extremes, is a leader— follower
arrangement according to which policy maker A goes first nd
then policy maker B decides what to do in view a-f the prior
decision by A.
This scenario may sound moderately descriptive of
current U.S. institutions in that fiscal policy first
determines the budget deficit and then monetary policy
decides how mLch of this deficit to monetize. However,
things are a bit more complicated because monetary policy
decisions are made much mare -frequently (monthly?) than
fiscal policy decisions (annually?), so sometimes the Fed is
the leader.
Under a leader—follower arrangement, the follower runs
the show, albeit subject to same constraints placed on him by
the leader's prior decision.If the follower has enough
instruments at his disposal, these constraints may not be
binding.In this case, the leader—follower system isPAGE 3 5
equivalentto having a single stabilizationauthority(the
follower). But if the follower does not have enough
instruments, then the constraints imposed by the leader are
real ones and may preclude the attainment of the (follower's)
first—best optimum.
For this reason, the leader—follower system may work
very differently depending on whether the Fed or the
government is the leader.I have noted above that, at least
in principle, a fiscal authority interested in targetting y,
P, and I/V can achieve its aims regardless of what monetary
policy does. Under these ideal circumstant:es, the leader—
follower system with the Fed asleader isequivalent to
givingfull control to the fiscal authorities.
However, the central bank enjoys no such luxury. Its
three traditional instruments (reserve requirements, open
market operations, and discount policy) probably give it only
one independent instrument for stabilization purposes. If
so, a leader— follower arrangement with the Fed as follower
is not at all equivalent to vesting full control in the Fed.
This asymmetry, it seems, is something of which the Fed is
fully aware. It may be why Chairman Volckersmilesso
infrequently.
Even without this asymmetry, the outcome will depend on
who leads and who follows. Suppose, first, that the fiscal
authority is the leader. Itsets government spending, taxes,
and transfers where itwants them, in full knowledge thatPAGE 36
these decisions will evoke some response from the Fed.In
the case of the simple game in Figure 5, the administration
can predict with confidence that the Fed will play
"contraction" regardless ofthefiscal—policy decision. So
it will surelyplay "expansion." Weget the Nash equilibrium
once again.
By a similar line of reasoning, it is easy to see that
the same Nash equilibrium will arise if the Fed is the leader
and the administration is the follower. However, this is not
a general result. In general, the two leader—follower
solutions are different, and each differs from theNash
equilibrium <15>.
Under a leacier—follcwer arrangemEnt, the follower's
attitudes clearly influence the leader's decision because
when the leader makes his decision he takes into account the
anticipated response of the follower. For example, -Fear of
the high interest rates that the Fed might cause probably led
Congress to adopt a less expansive budget this year than it
otherwise would have chosen.
In a dynamic framework, still more possibilities for
policy interactions arise. The -follower knows, for example,
that his decision in period 1 will influence the
circumstances facing, and thus the decision made by, the
leader in period 2. He will probably take this into account
in making his period 1 decision. <16> At least potentially,
this dynamic interaction can reduce the loss from lack ofPAGE 37
coordination by getting the leader to adopt policies more in
tune with the objectives of the follower.Continuing the
same example, by keeping a tight rein on credit the Fed
exercises a kind of discipline (albeit a minor one) over
fiscal policy so long as Congress abhors high interest rates
and believes that deficits will not be monetized at the
margin. This pushes fiscal decisions more in the direction
favored by the Fed. The follower is not a toothless tiger
even i-f he has but one instrument and many targets.
D. ONE PARTY FOLLOWS A NON—REACTIVE RULE
One way for the leader to avoid being manipulated by the
folJ.ower is to adopt a non—reactive policy rule such as the
famous k—percent rule for monetary policy. The key word here
is not "rule," but "non—reactive."If the Fed (the follower)
knows that the government (the leader) is following a fiscal
rule that reduces spending whenever interest rates rise, it
can induce the government to cLitspendingby pushing up
interest rates. But no such possibilities arise if the
government follows a non—reactive rule..
While many fiscal rules (balancing the budget, balancing
the high—employment budget, etc.) have been suggested, none
of them seem to be non—reactive. No one, to my knowledge,
has advocated a k—percent rule -for government spending or for
tax receipts, though some o-F the suggestions for
constitutional restraints on spending come close.. <17>PAGE 38
However, the most frequently suggested rule for the
conduct ofmonetarypolicy is non—reactive. And the desire
to free the Fed from the pressure to monetize bLidget deficits
may be one of the major motivations behind this rule.
If one policy maker follows a non—reactive rule, then
policy is ——bydefinition ——perfectlycoordinated. One way
to think about non—reactive rules is as a way to give up some
freedom of action (the loss of one or more stabilization
policy instruments) in return for greater policy
coordination. Ifthenon—coordination problem is big enough,
it may actually make sense to do this. To extend a well—worn
metaphor, if one o-Fyourhands will simply fight with the
other, it really may be better to tie one hand behind your
back.PAGE 39
V.SOME EXAMPLES OF MONETARY—FISCAL RULES
Let us consider some specific rules that have actually
been suggested for monetary and/or fiscal policy.. Are these
rules likely to increase or decreasepolicycoordination?
Are they likely to improve the fiscal— monetary mix? How are
theylikely tofunction in theshort rung when the emphasis
is on stabilization, versus in the long run when the
emphasis is on growth?
A. HARD—CORE MONETARISM
The most famous and mostwidely—discussed suggestion for
fiscal and monetary rules can be attributed, more or less
accurately, to Milton Friedman. Under Friedman's suggested
regime, which I will call"hard—core monetarism," the Fed
would keep the money supply growing atsome constant rate and
the government would fix its spending and tax—transfer
schedulesaccording to allocative considerations.. Both would
refuse to deviate from these r-ules for cyclical reasons.
Notice that under this regime both policy makers would be
following non—reactive rules..
One new element has entered the debate in recent years..
Some years ago, Solow and I (197.) showed thatpolicy of
holding the money supply constant and financing all deficitsPAGE 40
by issuing bonds could destabilize the economy, whereas
•financing deficits by money creation probably led to a stable
system. This finding, while derived in a very simple and
special case with fixed prices, has proven to be remarkably
rc,bLIst. Tobin and Buiter (1976) established a parallel
result for a full—employment economy with perfectly flexible
prices. Pyle and Turnovsky (1976) and others showed that
analogous results obtain in models intermediate between these
two extremes such as models with an expectations— augmented
Phillips curve.
Recently, McCallum (1981, 1982), Smith (1982) and
Sargent and Wallace (1981) have re—emphasized the importance
of this result for the hard—core monetarist policy rule.
Though using rather different models, each has made the same
point: that the system is liable to be dynamically unstable
under a policy that holds both fiscal policy (defined in
various ways by the different authors) and the money supply
(or its growth rate) constant.
The mechanism behind these results is not hard to
understand. Suppose some shock (such as an autonomous
decline in demand in a Keynesian model) opens up a deficit in
the government budget, and the hard—core monetarist regime is
in force. Bonds will be issued to finance the deficit. With
both interest rates and the number of bonds increasing,
interest payments on the national debt will be increasing.
But this increases the deficit still further, requiring evenPAGE i
largerissues o-f bonds in subsequent periods, and the process
repeats..I-f the real rate of interest exceeds the rate o-f
populationgrowth, then the realsupply of bonds per capita
willgrowwithout limit. Consequently, unless bonds are
totally irrelevant to other economic variables (as in the
non— Ricardian view o-f Barro (1974)), the whole economy will
explode. <18>
So the stabilizing properties of the hard—core
monetarist rule are open to serious question, to say the
least. Whatabout its longer—runeffects?
As a long—run defense against inflation, the monetarist
rule seems to be very e-ffective.. Although academic
scribblers can, and have constructed examples of continuous
inf].aton without money growth, my feeling is that policy
makers can justifiably treat these models as intellectual
curiosa and proceed on the assumption that a maintained money
growth rate will eventually control th rate of inflation.
But what about capital formation and real economic
growth? When a recession comes, the hard—core monetarist
rule takes no remedialaction.I-f there is an important
accelerator aspect to investment spending, the slack demand
will retard capital formation. At the same time, the
issuance c-f new government bonds to finance the budget
deficits that recession brings will push up interest rates.
And this, too, w-ill retard invesment spending. The likely
result isthathard—core monetarism will not create a climatePAGE
conducive to investment unless long—run predictability of the
price level is a more important determinant of investment
than I think it is. <19>
It seems to me that much oftheconcern over fiscal—
monetary coordination derives from concern over the
implications of the policy mix for investment. If so, then
hard—core monetarism, which eliminates the coordination issue
by eliminating policy, does not look to be a very good
sol ut i on.
B. BONDISM
As McCallum (1981) first pointed out, a potentially
better monetary—fiscal rule was actually suggested by
Friedman in his earlier 'A Monetary and Fiscal Framework -for
Economic Stability" (1948), but subsequently abandoned. For
lack ofabetter name,GarySmith (1982) has suggested that
-we call the policy "bondism" because it treats bonds in much
the same way as monetarism treats money.
Under the old Friedman policy, both fiscal and monetary
policywould be governed by rules, but the monetary rule
would bereactive. In particular, Friedman suggested that
governmentspending and tax ratesbeset in accordance with
allocativeconsiderations, as in the monetarist rule, but
that all deficits be financed by money creation. Both
McCallum (1981, 1982) and Smith (1982) observed that this
policy regime is equivalent to. the "money financing" scenario
I-PAGE '43
in Blinder and Solow (1973), and hence probably leads to a
stable system. On this score alone, it has much to recommend
it over monetarism.
But there is more to the story. Consider what would
happen when, for example, a deficiency o-Faggregatedemand
brought on a recession. Falling incomes would open up a
budget deficit, and this would automatically induce the Fed
to open the monetary spigots. The economy would get a strong
anti—recessionary stimulus from monetary policy. And I do
mean strong. Think about the empirical magnitudes involved.
In the current U.S. economy, a 1 percentage point rise in the
unemployment rate adds about $25 billion to the budget
deficit. But the "money" that would be issued to finance the
deficit would be high—powered money. Adding $2 billion in
new bank reserves is a colossal injection of money; it would
increase total bank reserves by nearly 50 percent! Thus the
oldFriedman rule would seem to be an incredibly powerful
stabilizer. <20>
Howdoes it score on the more long—run criteria? The
fact that recessions would automatical1 y engender easy money
under the "bondist" policy augurs well for capital formation.
So does the notion that cyclical disturbances would probably
be quite muted. The one potential worry is over inflation.
The rule can concEivably lead to a lot of money creation in a
hurry, with subsequent inflationary consequences. But i-f the
fiscal part o-f the rule keeps the high—employment budgetPAGE '4
balanced, and if the economy fluctuates around its high—
employment norm, this should not be a major worry. Monetary
expansions should subsequently be reversed by monetary
contractions. <21> If the rule is believed, even large
injections of money should not raise the spectre of secular
inflation.
Finally, note that the old Friedman rule completely
eliminates the possibility that monetary and fiscal policy
might act at cross pLirposes. Under the rule, monetary policy
is expansionary if and only if fiscal policy (defined by the
automatic stabilizers) is expansionary. Also, the game—
theoretic considerations raised in Section III cannot arise
because neither policy maker has any decision to make.
While I have never been an advocate of rules, it seems
to me that all this adds up to a clear conclusion: the old
Friedman rule ought to get serious quantitative attention.
C. SOFT—CORE MONETARISM
The rule just discussed would make fiscal policy non-
reactive and monetary policy reactive. A symmetric approach
would call for a rule in which monetary policy is non—
reactive but fiscal policy reacts in a counter—cyclical
fashion.John Taylor (1982a) has mentioned just such a
possibility as a way to put a meaningful counter— cyclical
policy regime in place without creating expectations that
inflationary shocks will be accommodated. Under this regime,PAGE L5
monetarypolicy would adhere to a k—percent rule., but fiscal
policy would be used for counter—cyclical purposes. The
latter could be done either by rules or by discretion.
What can we say about this policy regime? Not much., of
course! until it has been given more theoretical and
empirical scrL(tiny. But a few observations can be made.
First, the coordination problem is de-Finitionally
solved. With no monetary pOlicy, it can hardly be in
opposition to fiscal policy. Second, the game—theoretic
aspects of stabilization policy would necessarily disappear.
The government could hardly try to "game" a k—percent rule.
Would cyclical stabilization be strong enough? That
cannot be answered in the abstract, since Taylor's policy mix
does not specify the strength of the fiscal stabilizers. But
it does not seem likely that they vould be as strong as the
stabiliz.ingforces in Friedman's "hondist" rule.
Finally, there is the long—run capital formation issue.
Reducing the severity of recessions, I believe, can only do
good things for investment. But doing so with fiscal policy
probably means that interest rates would be pushed up by the
counter—cyclical policy. <22> So there could conceivably be a
trade—off between short—run stabilization and long—run
growth.Page i6
APPENDIX
This appendix considers a monetary-fiscal policy game in
which each authority has three strategies: to expand aggregate
demand, to contract aggregate demand, or to do nothing. The
outcomes are ranked from 1 to 9 in the payoff matrix in Figure 6,
with the rankings of the fiscal authority once again below the
diagonal and the monetary rankings above.
Circles indicate the best fiscal response to each monetary
strategy and squares indicate the best monetary response to
each fiscal strategy. It 1s clear that box G, in the lower
lefthand corner, is the only Nash equilibrium. As in the
2 by 2 example in the text, monetary policy is contractionary
and fiscal policy is expansionary. We can also see that the
Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated by a variety of other
outcomes: boxes B, E, C, and F.
If the Fed is the leader and the government is the follower,
the solution is box F; this is the best the Fed can do if
constrained to the fiscal reaction function (the boxes with
circles). By similar reasoning, we see that box B will arise
if the government leads and the Fed follows. In this example
either leader-follower equilibrium is superior to the Nash
equilibrium (though the leader has more to gain).
Another possible outcome of complete lack of coordination is
that each authority ignores the other and shoots for its
global optimum. In the example, that would mean that each
does nothing and box E results. This outcome Pareto dominates
the Nash equilibrium, but is in turn Pareto dominated by box
















1. The irony of having such a subtle policy mix advocated by
those who deride "fine tuning" is almost overwhelming.
2 The former has been stressed by, among others, Christ
(1968) and Blinder and Solow (1973). The latter has been
stressed by, among others, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1981) and
Sargent and Wallace (1981).
3. The stability of the economy under this last policy has
been called into question. More on this later.
4. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see
Feldstein (1982).
.Indeed,under the hypothesis advanced by Barro (1974) ——
thateach generation has an operative bequest motive based on
thenextgeneration's lifetime utility ——theperiod from now
to the end o-F time is relevant.
6. See, for example, Blinder (1981), Hall and Mishkin (1982),
Hayashi (1982), or Mankiw (1981). Bernanke (1981) is more
optimistic about the PIH.
7. For an interesting discussion of forward—looking versus
backward—looking wage contracts, and how we might distinguish
between them empirically, see Taylor (1982b).
8. Divergent expectations have been emphasized recently by,
among others, Phelps (1981) and Frydman (1981).
9. It is hard to conceive of the other roLte: putting all the
fiscal policy instruments in the hands of the central bank.
10.Inreality, things are more complicated still because
the President and Congress often disagree over national
economic policy. A model of three stabilization authorities
may be better.
11. The opposite policy mix ——tightbudgets and easy money ——whileconceivable, seems to be rarely encountered.
12. The Nash equilibrium concept is defined as follows. Each
player does what he would if he knew what the other player
was going to do.It is an equilibrium in the sense that the
two resulting strategies are consistent with one another;
once the game is played, neither player has any desire to
change his decision. Not all games have a unique Nash
equilibrium. The fiscal— monetary gametobe considered herePAGE'8
does.
13. The example analyzed here is a case of what game
theorists call the Prisoners' Dilemma..
14. In the simple example of Figure 5. this pair of
strategies also leads to the Nash equilibrium. But this is
not generally true. A more complicated example in which the
Nash and other alternative solutions differ is offer-ed in the
Appendix.
15. See the example in the Appendix.
16. And, a-Fcourse,the leader understands this when he makes
his period 1 decision! No wonder game theory is so hard.
17. Indeed, it may be possible to view the Reagan economic
program as a non—reactive fiscal rule that will cut the
ratios a-f government spending and tax recipts to GNP
regardless a-f the consequences for interest rates,
unemployment, and inflation.
18. In a complex system, many mare things are going on than I
can describe in a single paragraph. For example, income and
prices are changing, with important consequences -for the
budget deficit. Yet the basic mechanism described here seems
to come shining through in all the models.
19.Or unless inflation itself is damaging to investment
via, for example, the deterioration of the real value a-f
depreciation allowances. Thi.s last factor has been stressed
in a number o-f places by Feldstein. See, among others,
Feldstein (1980b).
20.Maybetoo powerful. This exercise in casual empiricism,
in conjunction with the fact that the effects a-f high—powered
money on income come with a distributed lag, raises worries
that the rule might acti.tally destabilize the economy by
over—reacting to disturbances. The theoretical papers
mentioned earlier deny this possibility, but they ignore
distributed lags. The issue seems worth investigating.
21. This statement is predicated on defining high employment
as approximately the natural rate. WithaHumphrey—Hawkins
type definition of high employment, the old Friedman rule can
lead to inflationary disaster.
22. This could be avoided if expansionary fiscal changes
took the -form, say, a-f liberalizing depreciation allowances
or raisjnQ the investment tax credit. But the personal
income tax and certain government expenditures appear to be
the prime candidates to bear the stabilization burden.Page 9
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